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his EAP marks the start of our 21th year.
We begin with philosopher Dylan Trigg’s
review of the Merleau-Ponty Circle’s
“Flesh and Space: Intertwining MerleauPonty and Architecture” conference held at Mississippi State University’s School of Architecture in
September. As Trigg’s comments indicate, many of
the papers probed architectural and environmental
implications of Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the
lived body and environmental intercorporeality.
Next, architect Alvin Holm asks how we might
engage more fully with the places in which we find
ourselves, and educator John Cameron, in the
fourth letter from his rural home on Tasmania’s
Bruny Island, describes the difficulties and satisfactions of practicing a lived environmental sustainability. Cameron’s essay is accompanied by four
woodcuts of Bruny Island birds by his life partner,
artist Vicki King (see image, right).
Next, philosopher Bruce Janz examines the
concept of landscape, which he considers in terms
of provenance and subjectivity. He provides six
questions that he hopes might bridge the division
between phenomenological and historical/cultural
understandings of the landscape concept. Last, we
reprint a section from anthropologist Phil Stafford’s recent Elderburbia: Aging with a Sense of
Place in America (Praeger Press/ABC-Clio, 2009).

and staffing shifts. K-Rex’s collection of EAP issues
is available at: www.krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/1522.

T

Place & Placelessness Reprinted
First published in 1976 and still widely referenced,
geographer Edward Relph’s groundbreaking Place
and Placelessness has become a classic of the phenomenological approach to the study of place and
has influenced at least three generations of scholars.
For this reprint by Pion Press (the original London
publisher), Relph has written a new introduction
placing the book in contemporary context.
www.envplan.com/relph.pdf.
Below: Artist Vicki King’s woodcut of a Tasmanian masked
owl; see her images accompanying John Cameron’s “Fourth
Letter from Far South—- p. 14.

EAP Preserved Digitally
Thanks to the generous assistance of Kansas State
University Libraries and Research Exchange Coordinator Marty Courtois, all issues of EAP are permanently archived digitally. Called K-Rex, this archive is “open access” and freely available on the
web. Each issue of EAP has a unique and permanent
URL that should survive technological, institutional,
ISSN: 1083-9194
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Items of Interest

Largely through the efforts of philosopher Lester
Embree, the Interdisciplinary Coalition of North
American Phenomenologists was recently organized as a means to support multi-disciplinary work
in phenomenology. The group’s first conference was
held last May, at Ramapo College in Mahwah, New
Jersey. The editorial committee for that conference
represented Architecture, Communicology, Philosophy, Political Science, Psychology, Sociology, Geography, and Women’s Studies. Committee members included: Robert Bernasconi, Scott Churchill,
Christine Daigle, Lester Embree, Hwa Yol Jung,
Richard Lanigan, Frank Macke, Daniel Marcelle,
James Mensch, George Psathas, Mary Rogers,
David Seamon, Dennis Skocz, and Fred Wertz.
Contact: embree@fau.edu.

The 2010 symposium of the Forum for Architecture, Culture, and Spirituality (ACS) will take
place June 17-19 at the Abbey at St. John’s University in Collegeville, Minnesota. Go to:
http://faculty.arch.utah.edu/acs/symposium2010/ind
ex.htm.
Spacings of Technologies is the theme of the sixth
annual conference of the International Association
for the Study of Environment, Space, and Place,
(IASESP) to be held April 30-May 2, 2010, at the
Burkshire Center at Towson University in Towson,
Maryland. www.towson.edu/iasesp
Bodily Phenomenology is a conference to be held
May 19-21, 2010, at the Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge at Södertörn University in Stockholm, Sweden. A major focus is to encourage “connections between philosophical and empirical traditions” in regard to phenomenological research on
the lived body: “How can we do a phenomenology
that is not only a phenomenology of the body… but
is a phenomenology bodily informed?” Contact:
martin.gunnarson@sh.se.

The workshop, Phenomenology and the Vulnerable Body: the Experience of Illness, will be held
May 6-7, 2010, at the University of Hull, UK. An
interdisciplinary panel of speakers considers the experience of bodily vulnerability and implications for
the understanding of embodiment and selfhood.
“The resources of phenomenology will be put into
conversation with accounts of the lived experiences
of those living with illness, pain or other kinds of
bodily vulnerability.” For more information, go to:
www2.hull.ac.uk/FASS/humanities/philosophy/research/centre_for_research_into_embod/workshops
_and_conferences/phenomenology_of_ilness_febru
a.aspx.

Home Cultures is an interdisciplinary journal published three times a year since 1994. It is dedicated
to “the critical understanding of the domestic sphere
across time frames and cultures.” The editors invite
submissions from design practice, design history,
architecture, anthropology, sociology, archaeology,
urban planning, contemporary art, geography, psychology, folklore, cultural studies, literary studies
and art history. www.bergpublishers.com/BergJournals/.

The 7th International Conference on Design &
Emotion will be held October 4-7, 2010, at the Institute of Design, Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago. Held every other year, the conference involves practitioners, researchers, and industry leaders who meet and exchange knowledge and insights
concerning the cross-disciplinary field of design and
emotion. “Since this conference was first established in 1999, what many predicted then came to
be. Technologies are now able to achieve emotional
qualities and design examples using these technologies abound. While we have made significant progress in research and practice relevant to emotional
factors in design, many fundamental questions remain unanswered and new issues have been raised
as we experience major changes in technological,

The new academic journal, Interiors: Design, Architecture, Culture, begins publication in 2010 and
welcomes contributions that consider the spaces and
places within built structures. The aim is to “bring
together the best critical work on the analysis of all
types of spaces. Whether homes, offices, shopping
malls, schools, hospitals, churches and restaurants,
interiors are all embedded with meaning, both consciously and subconsciously, and evince particular
multi-sensory and psychological responses.” Go to:
www.bergjournals.com/interiors.
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Alexander became Professor of Architecture at the University of California, Berkeley in 1963 and taught there continuously for 38 years, becoming Professor Emeritus in 2001. He
also founded the Center for Environmental Structure, published hundreds of papers and several dozen books, and built
more than 300 buildings around the world. In 2002 he moved
back to England, where he now lives and works. Alexander is
widely recognized as the father of the pattern language movement in computer science, which has led to important innovations such as Wiki, and new kinds of object-oriented programming. He is the recipient of the first medal for research
given by the American Institute of Architects, and has been
honored repeatedly for his buildings in many parts of the
world.
Alexander remains a practicing professional architect and
a licensed contractor in the state of California. He and his colleagues maintain professional offices in Berkeley, which provide city planning services as well as the design and construction of buildings. Alexander is also a prolific author and artist.
His unique combination of professional, scientific, and handson disciplines have been the basis for his evolving understanding of a new scientific and empirical basis for judging, building, and modifying the quality of the environment.

social, cultural, and economic environments. We
are at the stage for another leap forward in the development of new understanding and vision of emotional factors in design through our critical reflection, innovative exploration and collaborative endeavor.” www.id.iit.edu/de2010/
The annual meeting of Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture (EPTC) will be
held May 31-June 3, 2010, at Montreal’s Concordia
University in Montreal, Quebec, in conjunction with
the Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities
of Canada. Contact: eptc2010@gmail.com.
A conference on Scale, sponsored by the Architectural
Humanities
Research
Association
(AHRA—see EAP, winter 2009), will be held November 19-20, 2010, at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Questions to be considered include:
“In a post-humanist age, do we associate good scale
relationships with particular places and times in history? Do body metaphors still have resonance?
Should humans be the ultimate scaling device governing the design of artifacts from chairs, to interiors, buildings, towns, and landscapes? How do urban grids and networks affect scale? What is the
politics of scale?” Contact: scale@kent.ac.uk.

News from Readers
For his advocacy of Classicism in design, Philadelphia architect Alvin Holm has been given the 1st
Clem Labine Award, which honors “a consistent
body of work that fosters humane values in the built
environment.” Holm received the award at the annual Traditional Building Exhibition and Conference, held in Baltimore, October 21-24. We thank
Holm for contributing an essay to this issue of
EAP—see p. 13. He also sent the following email in
regard to the spring 2009 issue.

Alexander wins Scully Award

The 11th annual Vincent Scully Prize was awarded
to architect Christopher Alexander at the National
Building Museum in Washington, D.C., November
5, 2009 The prize recognizes “exemplary practice,
scholarship, or criticism.” The NBM’s announcement reads as follows:

I have always enjoyed receiving EAP, although I should confess I am often mystified and then sometimes discouraged by
the turgid wordiness of the typical essay. I chalk this up to my
own shortcomings and my own unfamiliarity with the lingo of
phenomenology. Somehow, however, my faith in your work
persists, along with a sense of the importance of EDRA, etc.
But I do not speak the language (yet), and that in itself may be
seen as a critique. Forgive my audacity but isn’t there a way
these notions can be expressed in less abstruse terminology?
Today, however, as I was reading the spring issue, all
kinds of lights went on and bells rang again and again. First it
was Shirazi’s excellent evaluation of Pallasmaa’s ideas that I
read quite happily, agreeing enthusiastically with all his
points. To dissect the architectural experience into so many
separate aspects is to risk missing their complex interdependence and the whole. Getting the pieces back together again
may become a major chore, if indeed it is possible at all. And
even if reassembled, will the organism live? Shirazi’s percep-

For nearly 40 years, Christopher Alexander has challenged the
architectural establishment, sometimes uncomfortably, to pay
more attention to the human beings at the center of design. To
do so he has combined top-flight scientific training, awardwinning architectural research, patient observation and testing
throughout his building projects, and a radical but profoundly
influential set of ideas that have extended far beyond the realm
of architecture. Indeed, at times it seems architects may be the
last to understand and to apply the benefits of his challenging
work.
In the process Alexander has authored a series of groundbreaking works, including A Pattern Language and The Timeless Way of Building. His most recent publication, the fourvolume The Nature of Order incorporates more than thirty
years of research, study, teaching and building.
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tive comments made a whole lot of sense to me.
Chamberlin’s essay on Heidegger was similarly engrossing. After my initial struggles with ideas like “unlearning” and
words like “originary,” I slipped into synchrony on the second
page at “To Think and Think Again.” A little later he writes of
Heidegger’s discussion of the roots of both words as deriving
from the Old English thanc, a fascinating etymology in itself.
To that I would like to add some thoughts from the medieval mystic Julian of Norwich that I encountered many, many
years ago in another context altogether. Julian wrote an essay
on “Thanking,” wherein she describes the reciprocity of words
in several languages for both giving and thanking. For example, we ask for mercy and when it is granted we say “merci”
(if we are French). We pray for grace, and when we receive it
we say “gracias” (if we are Spanish). We receive goodwill (or
thanc in Old English, or tong the Indo-European root),
and we say (if we are gracious ourselves) “thanks.”
And on it goes, perhaps in other languages as well, giving
and receiving have been named the same. For me this is an
exciting revelation of immemorial ideas of transaction, self
and other, human and divine, earth and heaven. Which way
does the current flow in a lightning strike? It goes from sky to
earth as it appears, but also it flows from earth to sky. In
DNA’s double helix, the directions are both ways as well, and
Hermes goes from Gods to human beings and back again.
How this all speaks to architecture I am not sure. Of Heidegger’s four fundamentals—earth, heaven, mortals, and
gods—the possibilities speak volumes. From my own deeply
traditional point of view, all modernist thought has gone astray
in architectural theory, if not in art, commerce, and medicine
as well. I contend that we think too much in ways no other
eras did. We sought to rethink several thousand years of Western culture. Instead of learning from the past, we have overintellectualized and killed the thing we took apart to study.
Look around at what we’ve wrought and weep. Other cultures have made shifts from time to time in some organic way,
based firmly on whatever came before–until today. As in the
production of snynthetics, we have grown quite clever in the
isolation of ingredients. But how well do they nourish us?

arches, I ask myself, ‘Which of these is closest to my own
soul? Which is the most fitting gift to God? Which of them
could best make a person whole?’ The questions clean out my
mind, get rid of the rubbish, extraneous concepts… and my
own ego—and so allow me the freedom to pay attention to the
thing itself.”

Joseph Cambray, 2009. Synchronicity: Nature and
Psyche in an Interconnected Universe. College Station, TX: Texas A & M Press.
This Jungian psychologist examines how psychologist C. G.
Jung’s concept of synchronicity and acausal connectedness
has “influenced the current field of complexity theory, which
works with a paradox similar to Jung’s synchronicity: the importance of symmetry as well as the need to break that symmetry for ‘emergence’ to occur.” Cambray develops what he
calls “cultural synchronicities”—a “reconsideration of historical events in terms of their synchronistic aspects.”

Farzane Haghighi, 2008. In Search of the Meaning
of Home through a Phenomenological Study of the
City of Kerman. PhD dissertation, School of Architecture, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
This dissertation draws on concepts from Christian NorbergSchulz’s Architecture: Presence, Language, and Place (2000)
to examine being-in-the city through a comparison and contrast of the old and new urban districts of Kerman, a city in
southern Iran. Key urban elements considered are the baazar
(market), meridian (square), hesar (walls), and darvaze (gate).

Ned Kaufman, 2009. Place, Race, and Story: Essays on the Past and Future of Historic Preservation NY: Routledge.
This book examines “how central themes in the American
experience shape the preservation of heritage—themes of race
and diversity, progress and tradition, love of place and lust for
property. Ranging from the 18th-century roots of preservation
practice to the dilemmas facing New York City today, these
essays… outline a re-energized, progressive preservation practice for the 21st century.”

Citations Received
Christopher Alexander, 2008. Nature Unfolding [interview]. Tricycle, vol. 17, no. 3 (spring).
Katy Butler, the editor of Tricycle, queries Alexander in regard to the spiritual impulse that informs his work. In responding to her question, “What does it mean to you to make an
arch that is pleasing to God?” [in reference to the dining-room
archways in his West Dean visitor center in England], Alexander replies: “Of course, I do not mean to say that God is
something like an old man with a white beard. It is something
deep in the universe, the principles that governs all things. To
do anything right, you need to be in touch with that ‘something’. To help focus one’s attention on this something, it is
necessary to find, in your mind, a blankness or emptiness and
let the solution arise from that emptiness. So, looking at the

Jeanne Halgren Kilde, 2008. Sacred Power, Sacred
Space. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
A survey of church architecture focusing on “the dynamic
character of Christianity and how church buildings shape and
influence religion.” Kilde identifies three kinds of power: (1)
divine power, attributed to God; (2) social power, relating to
social, particularly clerical hierarchies; and (3) personal
power—“the various feelings of spiritual empowerment individuals derived from an experience of the divine.”
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From Heidegger and Homecoming
Even before he published anything significant, Heidegger became
famous because he powerfully addressed how we might live meaningfully in the face of the massive destruction and death wrought by
technological warfare, how we might act authentically when the
power of the subject is either exaggerated into the cult of egoism or
annihilated before impersonal systems of power…, and how we might
hope appropriately in the time of nihilism that rises as traditional beliefs, norms, and customs fail. Here too his philosophical work joins
or is followed by worldwide contemporary attempts to work through
the loss and recovery of home.
Specifically…., Heidegger either directly addresses or clearly implies how we can approach at least the following four major problems
facing us today:
▪
▪

▪

▪

The existential problems of each individual person—how to live,
how to face life’s challenges of meaningfulness in our cynical
postmodern era.
Massive forced emigration-immigration and refugee displacement around the world, for example, as witnessed in the literature
and film of exile and diaspora and in the work of international relief organizations.
Technologies consuming and controlling life itself: genetically
engineering crops, patenting the agricultural patrimony of marginalized peoples, developing an international economy marketing organs and transplants.
Ecological disasters on a global scale: the destruction of the
Earth, the oceans, and the atmosphere—our home of homes.

[Some] forms of homelessness appear in our separation from the
natural world. Biotechnologies move beyond sharing the world to
make it more productive or suited to our desires, to the point where
they are already consuming and controlling life itself. Many hold that,
even with reservations about some dimensions of past technologies…,
we are moving into newly dangerous hubris and alienation from the
natural biological process of which we are a part….
In addition, environmentally, we are unquestionably destroying
our home of homes—the Earth itself—as we contribute to climate
change on a global scale. We are burning fossil fuels in our factories,
power plants, homes, and cars, releasing so much CO2, that we have
changed the atmosphere and the oceans….
Though resolving or even mitigating these problems will obviously not follow directly from what Heidegger says, his complex and
profound insights into homelessness and the barriers to the possibility
of homecoming… can help us to learn to think and act appropriately.
In the end, he does articulate a substantial understanding of how we
might come into our own. This could occur, however, only as we actually participate in a specific historical gathering-together of humans,
Earth, and the sacred, if there is such—an event in which the other
dimensions would simultaneously come to their own.
The first task on the way toward such a homecoming is to become
open to what gives itself, and for that we need to learn to better think
and speak about our current homelessness, a task for which Heidegger
will prove to be a consummate guide (pp. xiv-xvii).

Braham Boyce Ketcham, 2009. The Alexandrian
Planning Process: An Alternative to Traditional
Zoning and Smart Growth. The Urban Lawyer,
vol. 41, no. 2 (spring), pp. 339-57.
This planner proposes “an alternative to traditional American zoning practices” based on the work of architect Christopher Alexander, who attempts a generative planning process favoring small, incremental improvements. Discusses
“the practicalities and obstacles involved in implementing
Alexander’s planning process in a real-world setting.”

Lance Klein, 2009. A Phenomenological Interpretation of Biomimcry and its Potential Value for
Sustainable Design, master’s thesis, Department
of Architecture, Kansas State University.
“Building upon the claim made by biomimicry scientists
that a full emulation of nature engages form, ecosystem, and
process, this thesis uses a phenomenological approach to
interpret human and environmental wholeness. Phenomenology broadens biomimicry’s scientific and technical focus
on nature and considers how wholeness can be found among
form, ecosystem, and process; and between people and environment. The thesis argues that, without a deeper, more
responsive connectedness among people, nature, and built
environment, any proposal for sustainable design will ultimately be incomplete and thus unsuccessful.”

Sharon Kleinman, 2008. Displacing Place: Mobile Communication in the 21st Century. NY: Peter
Lang.
“Mobile information and communications technologies
(ICTs) are enabling people to participate in new ways and in
additional contexts in a broad range of activities…. ‘[H]ere’
and ‘there’ can be virtually anywhere, and, moreover, both
can be moving. Key features of mobile ICTs are their portability and their capacity for enabling people to communicate, seek and share information, and be entertained in ways
that transcend spatial and temporal constraints.”

Robert Mugerauer, 2008. Heidegger and Homecoming: The Leitmotif in the Later Writings. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
“Martin Heidegger devoted himself to challenging previously held ontological notions of what constitutes ‘being’,
and much of his work focused on how beings interact within
particular spatial locations. Heidegger frequently used the
motifs of homelessness and homecoming to express such
spatial interactions, but despite early and continued recognition of the importance of homelessness and homecoming,
this is the first sustained study of these motifs in his later
works.” Mugerauer’s book is of major significance for the
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topics covered by EAP, and we hope to review the book in an
upcoming issue. A section from the book’s introduction is
reproduced in the sidebar, preceding page.

This architectural historian examines “the visionary designs of
American architecture during World War II” and argues that
this wartime era was “a crucible for the intermingling of modernist architecture and consumer culture.”

David E. Nye, 2009. When the Lights Went Out: A
History of Blackouts in America. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.

Sherry Turkle, 2009. Simulation and Its Discontents. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
“Immersed in simulation, we are vulnerable. There are losses
as well as gains…. There is an anxiety that something is slipping away.” Examines simulation over the last 20 years and
then provides four in-depth investigations of contemporary
simulation culture: space exploration, oceanography, biology,
and architecture.

This historian considers US power outages from 1935 to the
present “not simply as technical failures but variously as military tactic, social disruption, crisis in the networked city, outcome of political and economic decisions, sudden encounter
with sublimity, and memories enshrined in photographs. Our
electrically lit-up life is so natural to us that when the lights go
off, the darkness seems abnormal.”

Mary N. Woods, 2009. Beyond the Architect’s Eye:
Photographs and the American Built Environment.
Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press.

Anthony M. Orum & Zacharary P. Neal, 2010.
Common Ground? Readings and Reflections on
Public Space. NY: Routledge.

This architectural historian argues that “photography has mediated the built environment since the earliest years of the medium. A photograph was and sometimes still is our first and
only experience of a building and its surroundings. The eye
behind the camera becomes ours, gazing on places and structures.”

A useful collection of extracts from significant discussions of
urban open space organized around the three themes of “public space as public order,” “public space as power and resistance,” and “public space as art, theatre, and performance.”
Included are writings by Jane Jacobs, William Whyte, Ray
Oldenburg, Mike Davis, Sharon Zukin, and Don Mitchell.

Michael E. Zimmerman, 2009. “Globalization, Multiculturalism, and Architectural Ethics,” in Architecture, Ethics and Globalization, Graham Owen, ed.
London: Routledge.

Joseph Parry, ed., 2010. Art and Phenomenology.
NY: Routledge.
The chapters of this book “explore visual art as a mode of experiencing the world itself, showing how in the words of Merleau-Ponty ‘Painting does not imitate the world, but is a world
of its own’.” Topics include: Paul Klee and the body in art;
color and background in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of
art; self-consciousness and seventeenth-century painting;
Vermeer and Heidegger; embodiment in Renaissance art; and
sculpture, dance and phenomenology.

This philosopher discusses ethical implications of postmodernist theory. Zimmerman’s real-world example is the dilemma for a Western architect “who attempts to adhere to a
postmodern multicultural moral framework, while being responsible for designing and helping to oversee construction of
a major commercial complex in a southeast Asian city.” Her
clients do not share the Western architect’s concerns “about
multiple perspectives and marginalized others.”
Zimmerman writes: “Postmodern theory criticizes Western ethnocentrism, metaphysical foundationalism, centered
subjectivity, and the idea of progress, on the one hand, and
celebrates others who have allegedly been dominated and/or
excluded by the practices and attitudes of Eurocentrism….
Unfortunately, such anti-hierarchalism deprives postmodern
multiculturalists of criteria needed to evaluate critically cultural norms and practices that give every evidence of being
domineering, repressive, and exclusionary.
“On the other hand, anti-hierarchalism may provide certain architects with the justification they need to design for
anyone [e.g., oppressive political regimes]…. A serious clash
of cultures can occur when a postmodern multiculturalist attempts to deal with businesspeople in a society whose commitment to modernity is largely limited to globalization defined as planetary economic expansion and integration.”

Christopher Payne, 2009. Asylum: Inside the Closed
World of State Mental Hospitals. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
This architect and photographer spent six years documenting
the decay of 70 state mental institutions in 30 states: “Through
his lens, we see splendid, palatial exteriors (some designed by
such prominent architects as H. H. Richardson and Samuel
Sloan) and crumbling interiors—chairs stacked against walls
with peeling paint in a grand hallway; brightly colored
toothbrushes still hanging on a rack; stacks of suitcases, never
packed for the trip home.”

Andrew M. Shanken, 2009. 194X: Architecture,
Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American
Home Front. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota
Press.
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IAEP/EAP Paper Session
how to modify attitudes to encourage more sustainable behavior patterns. “Community-based social marketing” is increasingly recognized as a legitimate approach to providing pragmatic tools that encourage behavior change.
This presentation provides a brief overview of the context and methodologies utilized in such social-marketing techniques. It then moves to analyze these approaches critically,
looking to phenomenology for more thoughtful directions to
better understand and shape values and world views.

At the annual meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) in Arlington, Virginia, November 1-2, 2009, EAP sponsored a special session on “Phenomenological Reconsiderations of Conventional Environmental and
Ecological Conceptions and Problems,” organized
by EAP editor David Seamon and philosopher
Ingrid Stefanovic. Papers were as follows.

Pragmatic Phenomenology & Climate
Change

The Saving Power of Fear: Rethinking Grizzly Bear Conservation

Edward Relph, Professor and Chair, Department of
Social Sciences, Univ. of Toronto, Scarborough.

Leon Chartrand, Visiting Professor, Ethics Theology Department, Xavier Univ., Cincinnati; Executive Director, Jackson Hole Wildlife Foundation.

A strength of phenomenology is its ability to elucidate the
richness of individual environmental experiences. Climate
change is probably the greatest environmental challenge of the
present century but is occurring relatively slowly and at a
global scale. Where is individual experience in this? Can phenomenology elucidate anything about climate change?
I suggest one can only understand climate change
through a phenomenological act of imagination that grasps
experiences of specific weather, such as hurricanes and
droughts, as opening out into an interrelated unity called climate; in other words, to grasp a particular weather event as an
aspect of being. Actions are needed to mitigate the impacts of
climate changes on economies and on the lives of individuals.
One of the weaknesses of phenomenology is that it translates poorly into practical actions. To remedy this weakness, I
propose a “pragmatic phenomenology,” linking what is
grasped through experiences of local weather with a sense of
the boundless unity of climate. I argue that such a pragmatic
phenomenology may need to be the foundation of any politics
that promotes the sense of shared responsibility necessary to
cope with the uncertain effects of climate changes.

Grizzly bears fascinate us, and it is this fascination that has
garnered broad support for their recovery in Yellowstone National Park. It is also well known, however, that grizzlies incite fear. I argue in this presentation that it is the current human desire to repress and conquer fear that may eventually
realize the grizzly bear’s demise, even as the animal has recently been removed from the U.S. endangered species list.
This possibility has become evident with the dramatic
rise of conflicts between people and bears in Yellowstone. No
longer are bears somewhere out there, foraging in a remote
corner of the park on some slope far too hostile for human
settlement. They are instead right here, roaming in backyards,
spotted from bedroom windows, and foraging in the undergrowth of our minds.
This situation has raised enough concerns such that biologists have enacted a management program to address the
growing number of human-bear conflicts. Upon closer scrutiny, however, one realizes that this program is apt to do more
to bring about the bear’s end than to maintain its recovery
status because current management programs interpret the
grizzly as a threat. Fear is understood as negative, and indifferent tranquility is perceived as the positive end. This presentation argues for a reconsideration of fear, interpreting it as a
mode of preserving and, hence, as a primordial element for
living viably and for being mindful of our place in nature.

Visualizing Scenarios: Theory and Practice
for Ecological Design
Robert Mugerauer, Professor, & Dean Emeritus,
College of the Built Environment, Univ. of Washington, Seattle

“Social Marketing” and Environmental
Change: Phenomenological Reflections

This presentation argues that dealing with environmental problems is especially difficult because: (a) the phenomena occur
as highly contextual, far-from-equilibrium, open natural systems best described by complexity theory rather than contextfree, stable, closed dimensions treated by traditional linear
science. Congruently, (b) management policies and practices
need to be based on complexity theory and not dominant positive science, since the latter cannot deal with the often surpris-

Ingrid L. Stefanovic, Director & Professor, Centre
for Environment, Univ. of Toronto; paper presented
by Univ. of Toronto doctoral student Luke Gelinas.
There is growing recognition that values drive environmental
decision making and that there is a need to better understand
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ing ecosystem responses to perturbations, including wellmeant human “correctives”—a requirement made even more
complex by the fact that diverse constituencies disagree on the
values, goals, and means appropriate to the task.
Because current approaches to natural resources simulate
the future based on modeling of and extrapolation from past
events, data that emphasize average conditions and incremental growth provide an inadequate, even misleading, basis
for planning, design, and action. Hence there is a need for new
modes of research and practice, which would integrate qualitative and quantitative dimensions if they are to enable us to
understand environmental phenomena and experience and to
develop strategies for successful ecological design.
Evidence is presented that a promising contribution to
what is needed is found in the shift to the use of “scenarios,”
which can be distinguished from the traditional scientific
claims to forecasting: “Scenarios are not predictions of what
will happen. They are an exploration of what might happen.
They are structural narratives about the possible future paths
of a social-ecological system” (Peterson et al. 2003b).

The People-Environment Relationship Reinterpreted as Triad through Philosopher J. G.
Bennett’s Systematics of Three-ness
David Seamon, Professor, Department of Architecture, Kansas State Univ., Manhattan, Kansas
Traditionally in the environmental disciplines, the peopleenvironment relationship has been interpreted in terms of
some dyadic formulation—e.g., environment shaping people
(environmental determinism); people shaping environment
(possibilism); or the two in some sort of mutual interaction (as
in an ecological conception). In this presentation, I argue that
the people-environment relationship might also be understood
through the threefold structure of geographical ensemble,
people-in-place, and genius loci (“spirit of place”).
To flesh out this threefold structure, I draw on British
philosopher J. G. Bennett’s theory of “systematics,” an approach
using the qualitative significance of number to explore phenomena. Specifically, I focus on Bennett’s interpretation of threeness and what he called the triad to explicate what he identified
as six “universal processes”—identity, interaction, expansion,
concentration, order, and
freedom. I argue that
each of these six processes offers a useful
vantage point for reinterpreting various aspects of the peopleenvironment
relationship,
or
peopleenvironment triad, as I
identify it here. I describe six processes:
1. place interaction;
2. place identity;
3. place creation;
4. place intensification;
5. place actualization;
6. place release.

This drawing by
University of Kansas
architecture
student Devin Norton was one of several images in
Montana State Assistant Professor of Architecture Zuzanna Karczewska’s paper, “Re-presenting the Space for
the Body,” presented at the “Flesh and Space” conference held at Mississippi State University—see report, next
page. In the drawing, Norton portrays graphically the lived links of his body-in-action as he works in his design
studio. His focus is the shifting dynamic between the spaces of body and studio. This dynamic is marked by different modes and intensities of engagement between Norton’s “lived body” and the “lived space” in which he
works. We thank Norton and Karczewska for allowing us to reprint his drawing. © 2010 D. Norton.
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Flesh and Space: Intertwining Merleau-Ponty
and Architecture
Annual Meeting, Merleau-Ponty Circle
Mississippi State University, Starkville, MS, September 2009
Dylan Trigg
Trigg is a philosopher interested in the relationship between place, memory, and embodiment from a phenomenological perspective. One of his specific concerns is how liminal and ambiguous places can contribute to the
formation of identity, both personal and collective. He is author of The Aesthetics of Decay (NY: Peter Lang,
2006) The paper Trigg presented at the conference was entitled, “The Architecture of Eroticism: Place and the
Memory of (Hyper)Flesh.” www.dylantrigg.com. dylantrigg@hotmail.com. © 2010 Dylan Trigg.

T

habitual routines in place alter and transform our
experience of an environment. Following this, Seamon’s paper sought to bring space syntax into the
scope of “place ballet,” demonstrating how each
idea enrich and informs the other. This idea was further fleshed out in the final part of the paper, in
which the author situated place ballet and space
syntax in a phenomenological context, identifying
its grounding in Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.
Singling out the idea of an “environmental
flesh,” Seamon ended by positing the primacy of an
ethical focus in the experience and design of the
built environment, in the process giving form to the
intercorporeal structure common to both phenomenology and space syntax. In many ways, this idea
goes against the assumption that space syntax is
overly concerned with an abstracted concept of the
built environment. By emphasizing the potential
alliance between phenomenology and space syntax—even against Hiller’s own doubts—Seamon’s
contribution is vital and refreshing.
The subsequent panel focused on memory and
meaning with papers by architect Guillermo Garma
Montiel and cultural geographer Karen Wilson Baptist. Both papers hinted at the complexities involved
in linking practice with theory, a tension that ran
throughout the conference. Baptist’s paper in particular, titled simply “Diaspora,” offered a rich
analysis of the intersection between death, memory,

he relationship between phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty
and architecture is striking in its plenitude.
With the exception of Martin Heidegger
and Gaston Bachelard, no other phenomenologist
has contributed as much to understanding how the
natural and built environment affects our being-inthe-world. With his concepts of the embodied subject, flesh, chiasm, wild being, and the intertwining
of the visible and invisible, Merleau-Ponty furnishes philosophers and architects with a rich and
challenging set of ideas unparalleled in their depth.
That the 34th Merleau-Ponty Circle Conference
should be devoted to themes of spatiality and flesh
is thus fitting and timely. Efficiently organized by
architect Rachel McCann and philosopher Patricia
Locke, the event was spread over three days, with a
co-conference devoted to Merleau-Ponty and architecture held a day earlier. Focusing on themes such
as movement, memory, materiality, metaphysics,
and “matrixial flesh,” the scope of papers was broad
in range, varied in quality, but united in theme.

T

he conference’s first paper, presented by EAP’s
own David Seamon, concerned the interface
between space syntax and what Seamon termed
“place ballet.” Divided into three parts, Seamon’s
paper began with a concise overview of Bill Hillier’s notion of space syntax with a focus on how
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ing with a topic often neglected. At stake in Koukal’s paper was the claim that spatiality is so central
to our being that once damaged by the incursion of
torture, that unity is lost forever. With this negative
formulation, the contingency of our embodied space
is no longer taken-for-granted but thematized in its
vulnerability.

and place. Considering how roadside memorials
afford a place to grieve, her paper touched on the
relation between spontaneous mourning and spectral engagement, arguing that “the landscape inadvertently gathers the talismanic remnants of the
dead, allowing the bereaved to eventually abandon
the roadside memorial and to relinquish their dead
to the landscape.”
As rich as these themes are, Baptist’s paper was
oddly lacking in a rigorous analysis of how these
places are experienced. One can discern a tension
between the landscape as a site of human remembrance and the landscape as an anonymous space
indifferent to human desire. What takes place such
that the landscape is elevated to the significance of
being a memorial? Where does the memory dwell—
in the landscape or the human body, or in both? If
both, then how is this communion between corporeality and place possible? None of these questions,
though implicit, were approached, perhaps partly
because of the paper’s somewhat loose relationship
to Merleau-Ponty, when in fact his account of time,
space, and phenomena (e.g., the phantom limb) affords a deep understanding of the spectral dimension of lived space.
Given over to the theme of “Ontology of Lived
Space,” the final panel of the day included two papers by architects Jassen Callender and David Koukal. Callender’s paper, “Among Time’s Images: An
Onto-Phenomenological Search for Extraordinary
Experience,” provided a theoretically complex yet
intriguing account of the “excess” in being, detailing the interaction between thinkers as diverse as
Bataille and Whitehead. Callender concluded that
“An extraordinary experience is an experience of
the excess of being which privileges the accumulation of knowing over the iterative quality of truth.”
A complex claim which perhaps merited more clarification than time allotted.
In contrast to the tendency to take MerleauPonty as an exemplar of the body-as-unified, David
Koukal gave a novel and cogent paper on a topic
typically overlooked in phenomenology: torture. Yet
far from contradicting Merleau-Ponty, Koukal’s
well argued analysis of the spatiality and corporeality of torture, exemplified the scope of phenomenology (and Merleau-Ponty in particular) for deal-

A

fter a successful first day focusing on flesh,
architecture, and Merleau-Ponty, the next three
days—Thursday through Saturday—were devoted
to the annual meeting of the Merleau-Ponty Circle;
in diverse ways, presentations expanded on the issue of spatiality. Philosopher William Hamrick began on Thursday morning with a fine paper entitled
“Topoanalysis,” a term taken from Bachelard and
referring to the systematic analysis of intimate
places in our lives. Hamrick linked this concept
with Merleau-Ponty’s account of topological space.
Hamrick set about rediscovering the meaning
of an “original place in the world” through a careful
analysis of his hometown, Ligonier, Pennsylvania.
What followed was an evocative account of smalltown America examined through the prism of
topoanalysis. Despite this—or perhaps because—
one wonders if this linage of thought inherited from
Bachelard risks an insular account of home, dwelling, and place. After all, the emphasis on origins as
a source of orientation need not entail unity.
One could argue that the “place-alienation”
Hamrick largely ignored plays a far greater role in
our experience of dwelling and remembering than
his paper acknowledges. This is an especially prevalent issue when Hamrick spoke of no longer having
access to the interior of his great-grandparent’s
home. The disjunction established between inside
and out sets in place a formidable set of contrasts,
of which Hamrick’s paper, despite its overall virtues, tended to overlook.

T

hursday’s afternoon events began with a panel
discussing philosopher Lawrence Hass’s recently published Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy,
which, if nothing else, served as excellent marketing tool for his work. Shortly after, English professor Nancy Barta Smith gave a provocative talk that
applied her situation as an identical twin to a more
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idea that human life transcends the places he or she
experiences, thus denoting architecture as an illustration of phenomenological ideas. The point is notable, as it questions the relation between architects
and their employment of theory. Norwood’s contribution was to posit the idea of “reversible architecture.” By this term, he refers to the possibility of a
“pre-human architecture” that calls upon MerleauPonty’s enigmatic idea of “wild being.”
The advantage of such a project is that it puts
forward an architecture that precludes a transcendental subject, given that the notion of “wild being”
refers to being that precedes the split between subject and object. As such, the previous model of phenomenology as person-centered is now extended
(but not displaced) to include “a person, a friend, a
large building, a door, walls, words about architecture, things around the architecture, and dirt on the
architecture.”
This move of allowing objects to speak to one
another establishes an entirely new area of research,
so far largely untapped in Merleau-Ponty’s incipient
notion of “wild being.” Norwood’s paper is thus
inventive and striking, and unlike the majority of
papers approaching phenomenology from a broadly
poststructuralist perspective, his dialogue between
Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze was not only constructive but judicious, too.
Friday’s keynote paper was given by philosopher Galen Johnson, whose talk was based on his
forthcoming book on beauty and Merleau-Ponty,
The Retrieval of the Beautiful. If the talk is an indication of the contents of the book more broadly,
then the reader can expect an extraordinary, nuanced, and impassioned examination of MerleauPonty’s aesthetics as a whole.

generalized account of intercorporeal being. Despite
claiming “not to speak for all twins,” her paper had
the unusual outcome of positing a “collective sense
of we-centric experience,” even suggesting that,
“we all share the imitative potentials of a conjoined
equilibrium.”
While this claim was surrounded in some confusion, it has the unfortunate sense of containing a
homogenized account of human experience in
which the idea of the autonomous individual is supposedly demythologized through the development
of empathy. While it is true that Merleau-Ponty
speaks of things in the world as being made of the
same “stuff”—namely, flesh—what this does not
mean is that the flesh has any particular relation to
kinship, harmony, or disharmony.
Rather, the flesh is that which underscores and
is prior to the split between subject and object, binding all things through being constitutive of the same
“element.” In this sense, there is no tacit ethics to be
mined in Merleau-Ponty’s flesh; as Toadvine (2009,
p. 134) explains, “That we are folds of the world’s
flesh, therefore, points to no particular ethical consequences, environmental or otherwise.” Barta
Smith’s claim that “flesh prolongs our embodied
being and makes twins of us all” is not only erroneous as a philosophical claim but also potentially naïve as an ethical and political statement.

A

highlight of Friday’s presentations was philosophy doctoral student Bryan Norwood’s
challenging paper, which was the recipient of the
M.C. Dillon Award. Central to Norwood’s project is
the task of assessing why phenomenologically orientated architects are preoccupied with perceptual
experience. Norwood’s paper thus took a polemical
stance toward phenomenology, which, while not
seeking to neglect the importance of perceptual experience, nonetheless sought to rethink phenomenology in thought and practice.
Norwood’s approach was to introduce
Deleuze’s thought into Merleau-Ponty’s concept of
the flesh. At the heart of this method is the question
of human centrality. As Norwood, pointed out,
“very rarely will a phenomenological architect or
critic talk about the perception between two architectural objects.” Implicit in this assumption is the

S

aturday, the final day of the conference, included papers by philosopher David Morris and
architectural theorist Alberto Pérez-Gómez. Morris’s paper dealt with the relationship between architecture and memory through Merleau-Ponty’s ideas
of temporality, habit, passivity, and space. Following an account of the phenomenology of remembering, Morris moved on to argue that “temporality and
spatiality are two aspects of our experience of ourselves as passive or to being’s exceeding us.”
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Applying this claim to the experience of place,
Morris gave an incisive though equally dense analysis of how “architecture articulates an ‘I can’ outside our bodies.” Morris concluded his argument
with the concept of what he called keep-places,
which emphasize the movement of memory in and
through place rather than its static retrieval.
Implicit in this concept is an ethics of architecture that singles out certain places that encourage
the learning and re-learning of a “singular past,”
rather than breeding an interchangeable experience:
“It is the house, city, or place well lived in that is
the preserve of memory—not airport hotels that approach interchangeability.”
This is a complex claim; suffice it to say that
precluding one place because of supposed “interchangeability” risks a premature assessment of the
environment at odds with phenomenology’s commitment to an unprejudiced experience of things.
This criticism aside, Morris’s paper was tightly argued and insightful. Despite lacking an affective
account of how memory and place touch our sense
of self, Morris’s argument provided ample inspiration for further thought.
Alberto Pérez-Gómez’s paper provided an extremely rich defence of a phenomenological approach to architecture, which surveyed a broad
spectrum of themes and ideas, while simultaneously
focusing on the depth of visual perception. For
Pérez-Gómez, “Depth is the dimension of perceptual cohesion and reversibility that allows for things
to appear as mutually dependent through their
autonomy and, reciprocally, to manifest their ‘objectivity’ through mutual concealment.”
Returning to the broad theme of the conference,
Pérez-Gómez suggested that it is flesh that allows
this reversible depth to emerge and envelop things
in its elemental hold. Pérez-Gómez explored these
ideas with reference to Le Corbusier, giving attention to the architect’s relationship to temporality, as
it relates to music and space more generally: “Depth
is here re-invested with a mysterious quality analogous in vision to the interiority communicated by
speech, poetry, and musical harmony.”

O

nations of Merleau-Ponty, many of the papers benefited from a direct application of the philosophy in
question, with Koukal’s paper particulaly exemplary
in this respect.
If there is an overarching criticism to be voiced,
two points might be raised. First, given the complexity of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the embodied
subject, the conference’s chief focus on the “personal body” in distinction to the “prepersonal body”
testifies to the need for further work in this aspect of
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Why is this distinction
important? Because it addresses the depth of the
human body as having different “layers,” involving
for Merleau-Ponty “another subject beneath me, for
whom a world exists before I am,” which is the
“anonymous” body (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 296).
The absence of the anonymous body in MerleauPonty presents a shortfall in his view of lived experience.
Second, the result of this absence of anonymity
is that a delimited account of Merleau-Ponty is presented—namely, one that privileges felicitous instances of embodiment. After all, what the prepersonal body brings to light in Merleau-Ponty is
that ethical judgments are of a different order to the
ontology of the body itself. As such, by focusing on
an “unethical architecture” (as philosopher Dorothea Olkowski put it in her paper) as primary, one
runs the risk of losing sight of the fact that embodiment is fundamentally ambiguous, not only structurally, but existentially too. As Merleau-Ponty
writes, “my life slips away from me on all sides and
is circumscribed by impersonal zones” (ibid., p.
386).
The anonymity of space and embodiment
means that we forever yield the possibility of being
lost in space. Yet being lost is not necessarily a condition to be “redeemed” through “ethical” architecture, but an experience to be understood as constitutive of the very experience of architecture.
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verall, then, the conference was a success.
Alongside several excellent theoretical exami-
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An Inspiration on Walnut Street
Alvin Holm
Holm is a Philadelphia architect whose firm, Alvin Holm AIA Architects, emphasizes traditionalist design. Note
his commentary in “news from readers” on pp. 3-4 of this issue. info@alvinholm.com. © 2010 Alvin Holm.
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means “Be where you are” rather than somewhere
else—for example, talking on the cell phone. When
guests on Public Radio say, “Glad to be here,” I
cringe because I know those guests are not in Philadelphia (where the host is situated) but in Chicago,
Los Angeles, or even farther afield. What has modern life, modernist architecture, and cyberspace
done to our sense of place, of home, of our spatial
relationships to the geographical worlds in which
we actually find ourselves?
Too often today, we live in a virtual world of
radical disjunction and jarring irrelevances to the
point that we often don’t know where we are in the
moment—physically, intellectually, emotionally, or
spiritually. But that little girl I saw on Walnut Street
was entirely engaged in where we all ought to be.
She was tuned into the street and to the city and ultimately to the wholeness of it all. Today, our environment in all respects—our urban fabric, television, internet, entertainment, the visual world in
every way—is woefully disconnected. We no longer
perceive wholeness, though at some visceral level
we still admire it and know it should be present.
The influential 19th-century educator Friedrich
Froebel wrote that “Every Child brings with him
into the world the natural disposition to see correctly what is before him, or, in other words, the
truth. If things are shown to him in their connections, his soul perceives them thus as a conception.
But if, as often happens, things are brought before
his mind singly, or piecemeal and in fragments [as
they are today], then the natural disposition to see
correctly is perverted to the opposite, and the
healthy mind is perplexed.”
One needs only to reflect upon a typical day to
see how thoroughly fragmented our lives have become. We know we need to be whole. Let that child
lead us. Let us all learn to see in the way she saw
that enchanted afternoon on Walnut Street.

eturning from a late lunch and walking
up Walnut Street to my office a block
away, I was enchanted by a little girl,
maybe four years old, walking and stopping, then skipping and running, then stopping
again to look at the ground where some tiny glitter
arrested her eye. Her mother was ten feet ahead,
immersed in a cell-phone conversation. The little
girl was literally bouncing off walls as she passed
along the embellished facades.
Architecturally, this Philadelphia block is a rich
composite of environmental design, incorporating
the elegant Rittenhouse Plaza on one corner and the
20th-Street Chatham apartments on the other. Over
the years, I’ve noticed that few people actually see
what they are walking beside, so engrossed are they
with thoughts, cell phones, or iPods. I have participated in neighborhood tours with residents who
have never noticed the amazing ornament enriching
the buildings—for example, the startling images of
cherub faces peering out from moldings, surrounding doors, and following passers-by with their eyes.
There are all manner of creatures stationed along
the walls, windows, and roof cornices. At the corner
of 20th Street, one looks up to see the marvelous
great griffins and gargoyles projecting from gothic
pinnacles of the Chatham apartments’ roofline.
I see these environmental elements because I am
an architect “of the traditional persuasion”—in
other words, educated as a modernist but eventually
converted to Classicism, a 2500-year tradition in
Western culture. As I write this claim, I am aware of
how odd or arrogant or backward it might sound.
But when I saw the little girl last week, experiencing the street as adults these days seldom do, I felt a
confirmation that she (and I) hold sight of something important that many others have lost.
In the 1960s, we heard the declaration, “Be here
now!” which, from this architect’s point of view,
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Fourth Letter from Far South:
Reducing Our Ecological Footprint
John Cameron
This essay is one of a series of “occasional letters” that retired environmental educator John Cameron will be
writing from his home on Bruny Island, just off the southeastern coast of Tasmania, the island state to the south
of mainland Australia. For earlier letters, see EAP, winter & fall 2008 & spring 2009. The bird woodcuts are by
Vicki King, Cameron’s life partner; portrayed are a pied oystercatcher, scarlet robin, yellow-tailed black cockatoo, and masked owl. Jcameronvking@optusnet.com.au .© 2010 John Cameron. Images © 2010 Vicki King.

A

lthough the nearest human neighbors on
Bruny Island are a kilometer away, wallabies, echidnas, and dozens of bird species come right up to our house. Living
in such a situation, Vicki and I often think about
“treading more lightly on the Earth,” both as a personal question and as a broader social issue.
As two recent radio talks illustrate, current debate on the politics and psychology of sustainability
is polarized. Discussing her recent Getting a Grip,
Frances Moore Lappe, involved with global food
and ecological questions since the publication of her
best-selling Diet for a Small Planet in 1971, argued
that current forms of representative democracy rob
people of a sense of contributing to the common
good and lead to a depleted
sense of self [1]. The consumer society, she claimed,
is based on a “mentality of
lack,” in which one can
never
have
enough,
whereas in reality people in
Western countries already
have all they need and
more. Participating in a living democracy would enable people to live richer
and more fulfilling lives while contributing to a
more just and sustainable world.
In sharp contrast, Austin Williams, a Londonbased architect and author of Enemies of Progress:
Dangers of Sustainability, provoked controversy
when he presented a vigorous challenge to “sustain-

ability orthodoxy” on radio a few days later [2]. He
described most environmental advocates as riskaverse, moralistic, parochial, obsessed with a philosophy of limitation, living in a state of dread,
lacking creativity and aspiration, and having no
sense of exhilaration in life. He championed the invigorating, innovative spirit of the modern city that
could deal with any of the real challenges of human
development. He urged listeners to aspire to a life
without limitation and reject the false choice between quality of life and quantity of consumption.
Beyond my general interest in these conflicting
viewpoints, I was fascinated by the stark differences
over the relationship between sustainable living and
psychological
well-being
[3]. Is the “mentality of
lack” embedded in the consumer society or in the
minds of sustainability advocates? Is sustainability a
matter of choice or necessity, and does it compromise or contribute to a
sense of richness and abundance? How do these matters play out in daily life?

I

’ve been considering such questions in relation to
our experience when we moved into our modest
house by the edge of Blackstone Bay three years
ago. The only power source installed by the previous owner was a car battery connected to two small
solar panels, which generated just enough electricity
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for two low-energy light bulbs for an hour in the
evening. Clearly, we needed more to live here full
time. Faced with the choice between having power
lines strung over our land and paying electricity
bills for the rest of our lives, or generating our own
electricity through a larger solar-energy system, we
opted for the latter.
In retrospect, we were two naïve enthusiasts
who took on a more sustainable lifestyle in a remote
setting without connections to power, water, or sewage. We were ill-prepared for the complexities that
ensued. It seems timely to explore our experiences
when the need to reduce our collective carbon footprint because of global warming becomes pressing
for everyone. There are many moral exhortations in
the media to “do the right thing for the environment,” but phenomenological analyses of what it is
really like to undertake a more lower-impact way of
living are less common.

We kept a diary of our daily energy use, which was
uncomfortably revealing in terms of how many
electrical appliances two relatively “green-minded”
people were actually using. Then we had to project
how much our lifestyle and electricity consumption
would change in our new, “simple” life.
Much more aware of our own use of electricity,
we now noticed how many appliances friends and
neighbors used. There are none so zealous as the
newly converted, and we tried to keep our comments to ourselves as we saw houses lit up like fairy
castles, televisions blaring with no one watching,
leaf blowers being used rather than rakes. We were
astounded at how much energy consumption was
advertised as being a wonderful thing: “Super powerful, super suction” 3000-watt vacuum cleaners,
massive 2500-watt hairdryers that “dry your hair
even faster,” and power tools of every description.

A

s the next step in the process, Simply Solar
installed solar panels, inverter, regulator, and a
massive bank of batteries to meet our projected
needs [4]. Since the total cost was only slightly
more than electric power poles stretched across our
paddocks, we were very happy with the
arrangement. We would be generating
all our energy needs from the sun, with
low maintenance, and no more electricity bills. When a man from the electric
power company arrived a few months
later to read our meter, we delightedly
and rather smugly told him there wasn’t
one. Unfortunately, matters did not remain so simple.
There was indeed little maintenance to be done. Twice a year at each
equinox, the inclination of the panels
needed adjusting and the specific gravities of the batteries needed regular
checking. But there was a new language to learn. The digital read-out on
the solar energy regulator was in amp hours per day
(AH). Although I could measure the AH coming
into the system, I couldn’t calculate how many AH
we were consuming. Autumn progressed, and the
battery specific gravities started to decline, indicating that the system was no longer fully charged. I
became worried. Even the last-resort use of a back-

F

or a year after we bought our place on Bruny,
we were still living in a suburban house in the
Blue Mountains west of Sydney. In preparation for
our move, we contacted a Tasmanian solar energy
company I will call “Simply Solar.” To
calculate how many solar panels we
would need, we first had to prepare our
household “power profile,” an effort that
was immediately eye-opening and humbling. We looked at the small metal
plates underneath every appliance we
thought we might want in our new home
to find how many watts they consumed.
I had no idea that there was such a difference in wattage between a blender
and an electric toaster, for example, or
between a tape deck and a stereo receiver. With each item, we asked ourselves the question: Do we really need
this? Right away, many appliances, such
as toasters and electric heaters, ruled
themselves out as too energy-profligate.
Our next challenge was to estimate the number
of hours per week we would use each appliance.
How many hours would we have the computer on?
How many electric lights would we use and for how
long? To even begin to make these estimates, we
had to pay much closer attention to how we lived.
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up, petrol-driven generator didn’t seem to arrest the
decline as the grey days of winter settled in.
As I was struggling with a new language, I was
also wrestling with inner demons. Behind my wry
self-description of being “technically challenged”
lay a psychologically slippery slope. I quickly had
to overcome my fear of approaching any unfamiliar
machine without an expert by my side, since all the
“experts” were in Hobart and reluctant to make the
ferry journey to Bruny. Technical instructions by
phone in regard to our declining batteries often left
me puzzled and, at worst, in confused desperation.
I re-experienced boyhood anxieties about my
lack of practical aptitude and common sense. Rather
than patiently explain how to construct or repair
things, my father tended to tell me gruffly to “use
my head” and to “grow up.” Caught in these childhood echoes, I was slow to realize that our solarenergy problem was not my technical incompetence
so much as Simply Solar’s gross over-estimation of
how much power, in the long Tasmanian winter, our
panels would generate. When a different technical
team finally paid us a visit, they recommended we
install a wind generator and replace the seriously
underpowered back-up generator and charger left us
by the previous owners. Meanwhile, to let our batteries recover, we shut off our low-energy refrigerator and prevailed upon neighbors to store food in
their freezer.

glance at the generator blades told me the direction
and strength of the wind. One spring afternoon I
was striding down toward the house with a bracing
Channel wind blowing straight in my face and the
sun glinting off the water into my eyes. I exulted in
the strength of the elements and lengthened my
stride. “It’s a high-energy day today,” I declared to
Vicki, and we enjoyed the new layer of meaning
that term now had for us.
The next winter, we found that Simply Solar’s
predictions that “we should be okay now” weren’t
entirely correct. The battery charge still declined,
though more slowly. For three months, we had to
use our back-up generator more often than expected. Our wind generator is rated at about the
same one-kilowatt capacity as our combined solar
panels, but that rating is at an average wind speed of
30 miles per hour.
Even a breezy place like ours, however, doesn’t
have such constant, high winds. Visitors frequently
marvel at our whirling wind generator, apparently
generating great quantities of electricity. In reality,
to generate large amounts of power, the blades must
rotate faster than the eye can see. In fact, the solar
panels sitting unobtrusively on the roof do most of
the work.
Over the past year, we have only produced
twelve percent of our power from wind, though it
does have the additional benefit of acting as a
“trickle charger”—in other words, replacing small
amounts of battery power overnight. In short, it is
wise to stand outside and measure average wind
speed throughout the year before deciding whether
to buy a wind generator, but this is one of the many
things that alternative power companies don’t always tell potential customers.

W

e found the idea of installing a wind generator appealing. Wind is a strong part of our
life on Bruny, with frequent sea breezes, hearty
winds, and occasional gales from the Southern
Ocean. Using another natural element to generate
power without significant environmental impact
was fine, as long as it wasn’t noisy and didn’t harm
the birds. A visit to a wind turbine in operation on
the mainland satisfied us on both counts, and we
placed our order.
By the time these additions to our alternative
energy system were installed, our original budget
for alternative energy had almost doubled. Still, it
was striking to see how our attitude to windy days
shifted. Vicki had previously found strong winds
unpleasant but, now that we knew the wind was
charging our batteries, it wasn’t so bothersome. It
became an informative part of daily life—a quick

A

ppearance and reality also diverge when it
comes to storage batteries. When Simply Solar
brought in twelve huge batteries, each nearly three
feet tall, I was impressed. Only after our first disastrous winter was I able to persuade a technician to
explain the situation:
“Think of it this way: Those batteries fully
charged hold about 1000 AH. What’s your average
daily usage?”
“Oh, between 50 and 60 AH, depending.”
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“Okay. Now, you want to keep them at least
eighty-percent charged for long-term battery health,
so that gives you about 200 AH leeway.”
“But that’s only a four-day supply!”
“Yep,” he smiled. “People think there’s months
of storage in these batteries because they’re so big.
Of course, there’s always some little bit coming in
even on a calm cloudy day, but you get the point.
You’d need a large room full of batteries to keep the
average house going through winter down here.”
I blanched when I thought of the extra cost.
Suddenly, it all seemed so much
more precarious—a safe-energy
storage capacity measured in days
rather than months. A year later,
though, we have relaxed now that
we know more about how the system works. We haven’t bought a
roomful of batteries but, rather,
have learned what we can and cannot do. While large-scale utility
power appears to be more reliable,
it now looks equally precarious in
a different way, since most of Australia’s electricity is generated by
coal and contributes to destabilizing the Earth’s climate.

“Oh, OK.” Still grumbling, I straightened out
the jumble of mesh, pulled the weeds out, rolled it
up and put it in the back of the station wagon. Over
lunch, I pursued the topic, saying that I didn’t want
to get into a poverty mentality, constantly restricting
ourselves unnecessarily so that our lives shrank. I
wanted an abundance mentality and a rich life together. Vicki argued for the value and pleasures of
frugality, saying she wasn’t talking about self-denial
and doing without what we really needed.
I scavenged some old metal posts from a fallen
fence on our land and attached the
chicken wire. We’d heard that floppy
overhanging wire on the top of a fence
discourages hungry, climbing possums,
so I used some discarded, thicker fencing wire to construct an outward curve.
Given my childhood experiences, I had
no confidence in my ability to improvise, tinker, and construct things, yet
that was precisely what I was being
called upon to do because of our isolated
situation and low-tech approach. Our
“possum-proof” fence worked and Vicki
has been lavish in her praise, which has
helped reduce my habitual feelings of
incompetence. My mantra has become
“this is another learning experience.”
One of the things we are learning is to recognize
and rely upon each other’s strengths. Vicki is
quicker on the uptake, more intuitive, and more farsighted, whereas I am more deliberate, perseverant,
and thorough.
The vegetable garden has been one of our
greatest sources of joy. Although Vicki had created
a magnificent flower garden in England, neither of
us had grown vegetables before. Vicki researched
and designed the garden from scratch, making
raised beds from driftwood we filled with seaweed,
and hay and horse manure from our neighbors.
Within months this base was breaking down into a
rich soil and we were harvesting our own food. I get
inordinate pleasure from collecting the salad greens
and herbs before lunch. I have the abundance I
wanted, too. There are bushel baskets full of our
tomatoes and apples. As I write, our neighbor’s
pears and quinces line our kitchen walls. We are

W

orking within the amount of
power and water we can generate and collect
now feels less like a restriction and more like an
opportunity. Coupled with living on an island where
there is no store and having a fixed income now that
I have “retired,” this discipline of “making do” is
steadily permeating all aspects of our lives—what
we use, what we wear, what we grow and eat, what
we re-use and recycle.
Vicki has been more steadfast than I have. One
morning she noticed some discarded chicken wire
by the side of a local road. “Oh, that’ll be good for
fencing our veggie bed, let’s pick it up.”
I looked doubtfully at the tangle in the grass.
“What, that?” I asked. “It’s a mess and full of
weeds. If we’re going to do something, let’s do it
right and get some new wire from the hardware
store. We’re not that poor.”
“That’s not the point. This wire’s here, it’s littering the side of the road and we can use it.”
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eating more seasonal produce, accepting what is
given in each season’s bounty, and having less of
what is not locally provided.
We are enjoying doing everything we can to recycle and reduce our carbon footprint. Nearly all
our clothes come from second-hand stores. Vicki is
delighted when she finds something useful from the
“fifty-cent rack.” Not only are these perfectly good
clothes a tiny fraction of the cost of new apparel,
but they don’t consume resources to produce or do
they clog up landfills in the way they would if they
had been discarded. Our only water supply is the
rainwater we collect in tanks from our roof, and we
have learned to restrict our usage in dry times and
still have enough to water the many young native
trees we have planted. We have a composting toilet
that uses no water.

gists. Flick the switch and the light comes on. It’s
automatic. Now that we generate our own power on
site, however, consuming and producing electricity
has become a subject of regular conversation and
awareness. I hadn’t expected that the light would be
shone, on one hand, on my own attitudes and fears
of technical inadequacy; and, on the other hand, on
the psychology of learning. No longer taking electricity for granted has involved coming face-to-face
with some demons I thought had been subdued—
feelings of helplessness, isolation and incompetence, and my desires for comfort and security.
The experience of reducing our ecological footprint has brought home to me the inseparability of
person and world that Heidegger called Dasein, or
being-in-the-world. There are many aspects of this
process of connecting what had previously seemed
to be separate. For example, when we lived in the
Blue Mountains, there was no relationship between
local weather conditions and the amount of power
available to our household. Now, my body responds
to the vigorous embrace of gusting winds and blazing sun at the same time our solar panels and wind
turbine are charging the batteries for the house.
Turning on the tap now connects us to our seasonal
rainfall, and we can no longer blithely assume that
there will be water available whenever we want it.
The soundscape of our world has changed, the
house reverberates to the strong rush of the wind
and the particularity of bird calls, not the noise of
television beamed in from afar. We have made more
connection with our physicality as human animals—the way we move in physical work, the food
we grow and eat, our waste. As we experience our
own material and mental fragility more acutely, we
see the vulnerability of our land to local threats of
drought, erosion, invasive species, and the global
threat of climate change.

O

ur move to a more sustainable life has clearly
involved a substitution of physical labor for
fossil-fuel energy. I mash garbanzo beans by hand
rather than put them into a blender to make hummus. I cart hay, manure, and seaweed rather than
apply commercial fertilizer to the garden. I feel
more vitality and well-being than ever before, but it
has had consequences for my 57-year-old body. If I
go to the paddocks (a subject for a future letter), I
put on my “velcro armor” of back brace, elbow
strap, and knee braces. I’ve had to pay more attention to my own physical sustainability and, as with
our energy situation, it requires much more awareness and self-knowledge. After we both suffered
injuries, we had to learn from a physiotherapist how
to lift and move things properly. She described the
progression from a state of unconscious incompetence (being unaware of lifting badly) to conscious
competence (only lifting well when we remember to
pay attention) to unconscious competence (the
body’s lifting correctly of its own accord). Since my
preferred learning style is not “learning by doing,” I
have yet to experience the third stage.

T

he barriers to sustainability for us have been as
much psychological as technological. The idealism and enthusiasm with which we set out was
accompanied by a sense of self-righteousness, despite our best efforts to pretend otherwise. This has
given way to a more sober assessment of our limitations in the face of far greater physical and psychological challenges than we had anticipated. While I

W

hat can be said of our journey into sustainability from a phenomenological point of
view? The first observation is that for most people
in the Western world, electricity has become part of
the lifeworld, the taken-for-granted quality of everyday life that is of central interest to phenomenolo-
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I wonder how he feels about his isolation in the silences of
Tsakang, which he has not left in eight years now and, because
of his legs, may never leave again… Indicating his twisted
legs without a trace of self-pity or bitterness, as if they belonged to all of us, he casts his arms wide to the sky and the
snow mountains, the high sun and the dancing sheep, and cries
“Of course I am happy here! It’s wonderful! Especially when I
have no choice!” [5]

experience great pleasure and joy from our life here,
I still go through periods of resistance to the discipline of living within our ecological means, followed by acceptance, even pleasure, in “making
do.” I’m coming to appreciate that what we are
given by this place each day and what we have now
is enough.
I admit that on occasion I have been the sort of
self-righteous and fearful environmental advocate
that Austin Williams decries. My worry about our
developing a “poverty mentality” is reminiscent of
his critique, but though he calls for a life without
limitation, I’ve come to see his viewpoint as more
limited than Frances Moore Lappe’s. Despite succumbing at times to the “mentality of lack,” I’ve
learned much about genuine abundance through reducing our ecological footprint. Deeper connectivity
with our immediate world as a lived experience, not
just as an attractive concept, has brought a greater
vitality and sense of “wellbeing-in-the-world.”
As regards choice and necessity, it is possible that this
generation could choose to ignore the challenge that climate
change presents and thereby
condemn more species to extinction and deprive future generations of the choices that we take
for granted. The alternative is to
make a choice at a deeper level
and embrace at least the moral
necessity of what must be done.
This raises a new set of questions about how the task can be
undertaken with the innovative,
invigorating spirit that Williams
champions, particularly in the cities where most
people live. Surely it isn’t necessary to move to a
remote location to learn the hard lessons that we
have: Ecological limits aren’t the enemy of creativity and well-being but can be their source.
Acceptance of what is given and the limitations
that come with it can bring a deep, almost paradoxical, gratitude. In The Snow Leopard, Peter Matthiessen encounters a crippled lama in remote Nepal:

M

aking do with less is more, for us at least.
More enriching, more fulfilling, more enlivening. Opportunities abound for us to live even
more resourcefully and resiliently with what we are
given. I was looking for abundance in the wrong
place when I argued with Vicki about the chicken
wire. It’s not about the things we can afford, much
less our material consumption. Rather, it’s about
opening my eyes and heart to the richness of what I
am given each day in this place co-inhabited by
such remarkable beings as herons and sea eagles.
The real poverty is to see myself surrounded by internal limitations and
external restrictions rather than by
fresh opportunities to learn and to
flourish.
Collectively, we must learn to
live within our ecological means. We
have enough. Isn’t that wonderful?
Especially when we have no meaningful choice!

Notes
1. F. Moore Lappe, Getting a Grip:
Clarity, Creativity ad Courage in a World
Gone Mad (Cambridge, MA: Small Planet
Media, 2008).
2. A. Williams, The Enemies of Progress: Dangers of Sustainability (London:
Imprint Books, 2008).
3. The difference can perhaps partially be attributed to
the context within which the two speakers work. Frances
Moore Lappe, Director of the Small Planet Institute, has primarily been working in Third World countries on food and
development issues, while Austin Williams works principally
in the City of London as the Director of the Future Cities Project.
4. To be specific, we have six 160-watt solar panels and
twelve deep-cycle storage batteries.
5. P. Matthiessen, 1978. The Snow Leopard (London:
Penguin), p. 246.
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P

hilosophy’s proper object is the creation,
propagation, contextualization, analysis,
and understanding of the concept. For example, what is the relationship between
words and the ideas they represent? How can a set
of concepts work as a kind of “meaning ecology” to
provide specific cultural or disciplinary needs?
Where do new concepts come from, and how can
we be deliberate about their creation? How might
we extend concepts to a new sphere or along a new
trajectory? How might we use concepts appropriately yet creatively?
Landscape is an intriguing concept to think of in
these terms. It often stands for a host of other place
and environmental words. I once asked a professor
who taught landscape architecture what she told her
students about what landscape was. Her answer was
that she didn’t tell them anything. Rather she asked
them what they thought it was. Students gave answers that ranged from place to home to terrain to a
host of other things. She was fine with that.
In fact, landscape is not all these things. It is
not the same as place, land, home, or terrain. Its
provenance is different, and its current uses cannot
be interchanged with other place-related terms. In
short, we must be clear on the concept we use.
This need for clarity also makes a difference
because different concepts arise from different disciplinary methods and questions. We may use the
same word across those disciplines or even within
the same discipline, but in fact the concepts are not
the same because they usually do different work.

Disciplines have resources for systematically
asking questions and answering them. Both questions and answers are necessary, but it is questions
that are said to be on the way to something more
substantial. I would like to question our questions—
to see where our concepts come from and what
work they do.
In this essay, I consider two ways by which
philosophers might interrogate the concept of landscape: first, the history and adaptation of concepts;
second, phenomenology. Both approaches have implications for the relationship between language and
landscape. Superficially, the first may seem an “external” way of understanding a concept through its
“provenance,” while the second may seem “internal” in the sense that phenomenology takes up questions of subjectivity.
I argue these two approaches need each other—
that each opens to the other. More precisely, I attempt to demonstrate that the concept of landscape
is a useful context for thinking about how meaning
is shaped culturally and how speaking and referring
are not just afterthoughts of an already constructed
subjectivity but are constitutive of it. In other
words, our sense of landscape, like our sense of
place, is fundamental to who we are. It is not just an
idea deployed to serve a descriptive, analytic, or
theoretical purpose.

Traveling across Disciplines
The concept of landscape has traveled across disciplinary boundaries. Its provenance passes through
art, but from there we find it used metaphorically in
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rectly inscribed in the land or written about the land
to deciphering schematic representations of the land
expressed in latitude and longitude. At the same
time, landscape painting brought the human back
into the world by pictorially representing people as
engaged in that land. What we lost in the map, we
recovered in the picture.
Similarly, with the rise of the GPS, we engage
the landscape in a different way. GPS takes the burden of a particular kind of way finding out of narrative, which is thus freed to do other things with
landscape. In this sense, cultural engagement is particularly important, partly because we are in need of
new ways of understanding what it means to live in
and with the land—not just on it.
On one hand, we could interpret landscape as a
system of signs arising from a particular culture and
history. On the other hand, we could interpret landscape as an “ecology” of concepts shared among
disciplines but changing according to disciplinary
demands. I use the term “disciplinary” here broadly,
to indicate any making of knowledge with an object, method, and history. This difference can be
phrased in terms of “synchronic” and “diachronic”—in other words, understanding how concepts are used informally at a particular moment in
time vs. understanding how concepts become formalized, disciplinary property.
Why is this difference important? Because
landscape is not synonymous with land, territory,
region, or even place. In the history of Western art,
for example, landscape eventually took on a character of its own. We can trace this shift through the
paintings of Claude Lorrain through the Dutch masters to the American Hudson River School and,
later, the Canadian Group of Seven.
Today, the sense of landscape often moves
away from a literal connection with land to more
abstract expressions—we speak, for example, of a
“landscape of corporate culture” or “the web as a
landscape through which we navigate.” If we are
cognitive scientists, we might highlight the “landscape of the brain.”
In this sense, to speak of landscape is to speak
of spatial movement, whether literal or figurative,
remembered or anticipated, solitary or collective. In
one significant sense, the space is created by the

many other ways. There are moonscapes, seascapes,
cityscapes, and so forth. Roberto Matta and other
surrealists painted “inscapes”—the “scape” of the
interior world. People speak of a political or religious landscape.
What these various uses share in common is
engagement with the land, either by traveling
through or living with it. These uses of landscape
involve a recognition of contours and a sense that
the land makes a whole rather than a piecemeal
composite of discrete parts. These uses suggest land
as narrative, whether placed on the land in the process of naming and representing it or implicit in a
natural or human engagement with the land. There
is an element of temporality in these uses of narrative, illustrated most literally in the history of landscape painting, which often included ruins or some
indication of the interaction of the human past with
the quotidian present.
Arguably, the advent of geographic-positioning
systems (GPS) signals the end of landscape, since,
through use of this technology, there is no longer
the necessity of direct engagement with the land.
With GPS, we do not need to read the land, either
literally or through textual proxies such as maps.
We follow instructions, based on geographical information readable primarily through a device,
which fixes position not by any aspect of lived human meaning but through overlapping signals that
triangulate positions on an abstract grid.
With GPS, our environmental embodiment
does not need to unfold as we move through the
land. Rather, we are self-contained and apart from
the land, through which we still move but from one
digital marker to the next. Our engagement with the
land becomes instrumental in that a digital indicator
or mechanical voice provides directions and is not
concerned with what lies in between. Places are first
of all coordinate points rather than geographical intensifications. Nothing is any longer related to history or myth. Removed from narrative and shifted
to technology, navigation is taken out of language.
Rather than claiming that GPS marks the death
of landscape, it might be better to say that this technology points toward a new means of engaging the
landscape. At the beginning of the modern era, our
orienteering moved from reading “texts” more di-
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interest, however, is all sorts of movement across
surfaces—something we find in both landscape and
writing. What is significant in Ingold’s work is his
ability to move across cultural boundaries to identify the ways in which narrative becomes inscribed
on the land and the land becomes understandable as
elements of narrative in a host of different ways.
It is important to note that the move from descriptive to hermeneutic phenomenology is in part
the move from the search for the universal in experience to the recognition that all experience
comes mediated through interpretive mechanisms—
in other words through the particular personal and
cultural situations of individual and group. Husserl
could write the Cartesian Meditations as a primer
on phenomenology because he was following Descartes’ lead of attempting to find a universally reliable method for knowledge. Heidegger, on the other
hand, is resolutely anti-Cartesian. If we are to look
for philosophical method that will not only allow us
to analyze place but also be sensitive to the implications that place might have on the emergence and
development of knowledge, we will find the
Husserlian vs. Heideggerian explications dramatically different in emphases and conclusions.
Whatever its particular sense, there is a conviction in all phenomenological efforts that philosophy
must be about experience, though what it means to
access that experience may vary with phenomenologist. In addition, what we do with experience
once we describe or interpret it may also differ,
though we are definitely not engaged in thinking
about metaphysical abstractions, whether in regard
to the land or to the self. Landscape is not land but
experience of the land. A theoretical approach that
appreciates that distinction is crucial.

movement and does not pre-exist our engagement
with it. We see the land as something. In ecological
psychologist James Gibson’s words, it “affords”
something for us, just as a chair “affords” sitting.

Phenomenology of Landscape
When we think about phenomenology and place, we
need to distinguish between different styles and approaches. In founding phenomenology, Edmund
Husserl sought to find the universal in experience
by bracketing off metaphysics, including ideas such
as “objectivity” and “subjectivity.”
In contrast, Martin Heidegger was much more
interested in interpreting human experience, including the nature of human inhabitation, dwelling, and
place making. For Heidegger, we are always caught
up with that which we know. “Dwelling-in” describes that engagement. What we build frames the
world in ontological ways—for example, in ways
that either reveal our humanness more fully or cover
it over and reduce us and our world to instrumental
things. Yet again, we can speak of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, which builds on the
lived body as the first site of experience—an approach that might be called “embodied phenomenology.”
Edward Casey is one philosopher currently
thinking about landscape. His Representing Place:
Landscape Painting and Maps (2002) sketches out
the provenance of the term and examines what it
means to represent landscape. Casey begins with the
Heideggerian claim that we dwell in the land and
thus turn it into landscape as we inscribe ourselves
on it. Further, landscape becomes the site in which
our subjectivity emerges and is made manifest. Casey then explores the idea that the landscape concept has a history, which accrues a set of meanings
by the path that it has taken through various forms
of knowledge construction in history.
But we can also find phenomenological accounts of landscape outside philosophy. Take, for
instance, anthropologist Tim Ingold’s Lines (2007),
which considers the relationship between movement
and inscription. Moving through and representing
the land, whether verbally or graphically, involve
proceeding along lines. Superficially, a meditation
on lines may seem not about landscape. Ingold’s

Language & Landscape: Questions
We have, in short, two methodological poles and
shades of difference between them that help one to
understand the relationship between landscape and
language. On one hand, we can trace the concept of
landscape across disciplinary and cultural changes;
with enough care we can tease out distinctions between landscape as a concept and other related concepts like land, terrain, or place. On the other hand,
we can ask about how we as human beings engage
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the land to produce landscape—that is, how we experience the land.
These contrasting approaches to landscape turn
on how we treat subjectivity. Both approaches give
us significant direction as to how we, on one hand,
might understand landscape within our own specific
lived situation; and how, on the other hand, we
might understand landscape across various disciplinary and cultural boundaries. To conclude, I present
a set of six questions that might be helpful in thinking about what it means to move across these
boundaries.

What does it mean to understand the other
spatially and platially? Does one understand
the other through or with place? Or does one
understand place by understanding the other? Do I
infer something about the other by understanding
their uses, namings, and practices of place, or do I
gain insight on place by understanding those who
inhabit it?
Heidegger is useful here. He would ask us to
see dwelling as a fundamental mode of being and to
see building as making possible dwelling. In other
words, we are never dealing with the purely natural
because we always build, even if that building
amounts to words about natural space designed to
render it less foreign.
One example is the idea of wilderness, a concept used quite differently in different places, in part
because of different relationships with the natural
other. Naming and defining that natural other is always entwined with the human other and, thus,
“wilderness” is something quite different in Europe
than it is in the United States. In Europe, the meaning arises from “wildness,” or the place where the
wild person lives. In the United States, wilderness is
the pristine—what is untouched by human hand.
In short, if one is speak of dwelling, one must
speak of it differently in different places. This is not
geographical determinism, but the recognition that
our places have a provenance—they are imagined
using the understandings we have available. This
perspective allows one to think about landscape
across cultural boundaries.

1

What is the purpose of asking about landscape? Are we asking about naming? About
place? Are we getting some insight into a culture? Are we sharpening our geographical knowledge? Are we finding ways of interpreting across
boundaries?
The question of purpose moves us beyond the
idea that we are working with bare concepts that
have no relation to social, political, religious, or
disciplinary perspectives. For example, maps of Africa were far more “filled in” in the interior of the
continent before the 19th century than they were
during the 19th century. Africa was not always the
“dark continent” but became that label as particular
kinds of questions about Africa became prevalent.
In this case, geography contributed to the colonial enterprise by confirming the prejudice that Africa was an empty continent with no history and,
therefore, ready for the taking. The African landscape became a way to avoid thinking about the
people who lived there.
For example, one can still find settlers in Kenya
from before independence who, regarding the “real”
Kenya as the place of birds and animals, speak of
native Africans as a corrupting influence. Landscape becomes the rural idyll, not only confirming a
Rousseauian view of nature but a Hegelian view
that Africans are by nature uncivilized.
If landscape is viewing land as something, that
“as” need not be benign or positive. In this sense,
asking why one inquires about landscape is a way to
identify narrative implications.

3

In what languages does landscape speak?
Landscape itself is a language that always embodies a set of conventional signifiers. For
example, Claude Lorrain’s paintings established a
particular vocabulary of the land with terms like
“picturesque” to refer to particular landforms. Travelers on the Grand Tour carried a Claude glass (or
“black mirror”) by which they could transform any
landform they encountered into a version of a
Claude painting, complete with frame and muted
tinting.
In short, landscape is always already language,
though this in itself doesn’t tell us much. To what
language does landscape refer? Or rather, what lan-
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guages might it be? Does landscape speak in dialects or entirely different languages? In other words,
is there enough commonality in the conventional
systems of understanding the land so that we can
speak of a common meaning core, or does landscape function like languages, sufficiently different
so that we are working with incommensurable
meanings?
The appropriation of landscape in the sciences
tends to turn it into a meta-term, applicable beyond
the level of locally significant signifiers. We might
recognize, therefore, that what counts as landscape
in the United States might be vastly different in a
Chinese context. On the other hand, we might also
realize that there are sufficiently similar ways of
making the land comprehensible so that we can
speak at this meta-level in a meaningful way.

proper form of engagement is primarily commercial, while the latter is more rich in expression,
since we can imagine other modes of engagement
that include sociability, diversity, and serendipity.

5

How does landscape encode time? In her
On Landscape, Susan Herrington (2009) explains that landscape exists along the axis of
time, particularly in terms of memory, imagination,
and anticipation. What kinds of memory does landscape encode? Does it preserve memory or repress
it? Is there something like anamnesis possible with
landscape—in other words, the “unforgetting” in
which we can re-member and re-construct a coherent past out of the traces that have been left in the
land?
Visually, there are many banal, and even bad,
landscapes circulating in the popular media. We
could mention the art historian’s favorite target,
Thomas Kinkade, and his hyper-real, hyperromanticized landscapes that have proved so popular with many Americans. Kinkade was by no
means the first—Constable’s pastoral scenes were
practically wallpaper in nineteenth-century England, a touchstone for the urban, industrialized
Briton to recover the “meaning” of British life.
What would banal landscapes look like in other
cultures? Could we recognize them? We can sometimes see such banality in tourist art (Africa is full
of images of the “Big Five” as if the savannah and
the veldt were reducible to them).
It is important to demystify the concept of
landscape in other cultures so that it does not just
stand in for older ideas about the exotic. If it is fundamental to any particular site of knowledge production that place and, particularly, landscape be
engaged, then we must also allow that this engagement could be done superficially or stereotypically.
Recognizing this allows one to consider what an
adequate concept of landscape might be in some
particular context.
And what kind of anticipation might be available in the idea of landscape, both in our own discipline and culture and in those of others? Does the
landscape narrative rely on a progressive-regressive
view of time and history? Or does that narrative necessitate a cyclical view of time with the future

4

How is landscape as a concept being used?
Focusing on use often allows us to tease out
the different provenances within the ecology
of similar concepts and assists in clarifying those
concepts. On one hand, landscape may be used as
the mirror of the processes of consciousness. In
other words, landscape can inscribe differing forms
of consciousness, and if we can locate differences
among those inscriptions, we can learn about how
consciousness operates and acts. In this mode of
interpretation, we treat landscape as a text, perhaps
more specifically as parole—the coherent utterances
that bear meaning and are the immediately experienced elements of meaning.
On the other hand, we might understand landscape in terms of langue—the invariant structure
that underlies the possibility of practice. Here, we
can speak of a language of landscape that is richer
or poorer. For example, we could imagine an extremely rudimentary language—a kind of protolanguage—that describes experience in broad categories that do not distinguish between kinds of related experiences. We could, in a contrasting way,
imagine a language that has elaborate means for distinguishing related but different experiences. Human-made landscapes, in particular, can be seen as
affording rich or poor grammar: Consider the contrast between strip mall and traditional marketplace.
The former affords a limited vocabulary in that the
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more or less like the past? Or is there yet some
other narrative of past and future as encoded in that
landscape?

between places. Neither did Locke’s examination of
place. For our purposes here, both efforts fall short.
If we are to be true to philosophy and true to
landscape, we must recognize that we can never
stop with categorizing or classifying. For philosophy to operate adequately at the edges of cultures
and disciplines, it must find ways to do more than
just translate. Cultures are never static. Landscape,
like language, is lost and renewed, appropriated in
controversial and trivial ways.
The six questions I raise here offer instances of
the methods I sketched at the start of this essay.
There I raised both issues of provenance and phenomenology. These questions indicate the kinds of
concerns with which one must deal in any attempt
to use landscape as a viable concept. I have argued
that the concept of landscape is actually multiple
concepts, rooted in different cultural and disciplinary spaces. As we move across those boundaries,
we risk misunderstanding but also encounter a creative opening that is only available as we question
the questions that produce the concepts we use.

6

What is an aesthetics of landscape? The
debt that landscape has to art means that disciplinary uses of the landscape concept have
often borne echoes of its roots in aesthetics. The
questions one asks about landscape are often about
beauty or (given the distinctions among the sublime,
the beautiful and the picturesque) about a particular
kind of order. More often this order is not the stasis
of form or proportion but the dynamism of motion,
since one typically moves through or to landscapes.
In other words, one typically participates in the aesthetic value of landscape.
This direct involvement means that description
of landscape elements alone does not fully capture
the aesthetic provenance. How does one encompass
the sense of participatory movement intimated by
the concept of landscape when labeling and naming
seems to calcify a dynamic understanding? One solution is poetry, which can push language beyond its
inherent tendency to freeze things with descriptions.
Might poetry be a central means for evoking a particular concept of landscape?
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Doing Philosophy across Borders
As I suggested at the start of this essay, one task of
philosophy is to analyze concepts and to question
the purpose and relevance of concepts for particular
tasks. Arguably, philosophy’s major contribution to
intellectual endeavor is the analysis of concepts and
the creation of concepts when needed. Philosophers
have typically worked at this contribution by starting from an abstract position, draining out all particularity and emphasizing essential characteristics.
In the case of landscape, this approach is inadequate. Abstracting from the lived sources of
landscape concepts expunge their significance. The
result is sterile and uninformative. Much of the
time, philosophers have not been particularly good
with particularity. Throughout Western history, philosophical approaches have avoided particularity.
For example Aristotle’s topos did not require attention to any particular place and did not differentiate

Place & Space Website
For both beginning and experienced researchers,
Janz’s website, “Research on Place & Space,” is
an exceptional resource for exploring topics covered in EAP. His aim is “to incorporate as many
traditions and perspectives as possible” and “to
cross-pollinate the notion of place across disciplines.” Website headings include:
▪
▪
▪

What should I read first?
General websites;
Resources on place.

To view the site, go to:

http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~janzb/place/
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I

suspect that if I asked you to imagine the
home you occupied at age ten you would
sit back, close your eyes, and traverse that
space in your mind’s eye. So it is when I
ask elderly residents of a local convalescent
center to revisit, in their mind’s eye, the homes
of their youth and early adulthood.
Opha Miller, 100 years old, closes her eyes
and describes the pasture seen from her back
window as if it still exists. She sits on the
porch and looks out across the road at the Wisnand girls. She recalls her husband, a good
carpenter, building that porch, and revisits the
bedroom in which she gave birth to a daughter.
Moving further back through time, 93
years, she describes how, at age seven, she
lived with her family in Texas and helped fill
bags with cotton and dump them into a canvas
covered wagon. She is crossing a little bridge
and hears a train whistle right up close. “I
jumped off that bridge and the passenger train
nearly hit me!” She never told her folks about
that since she knew that would mean trouble.
Through the irony of dementia she confesses
once again, three minutes later, and reiterates
the story just as before.
Another resident nicknamed Hack shows
me the photograph of his former home on the
wall of his room at the center. The photo is one
of those bird’s-eye pictures taken by itinerant
pilots who would then hawk the images to the
appropriate household. The structure is a small
bungalow highlighted in front by a stone arch
at the start of a sidewalk leading to the house.
The arch has no adjoining fence and so does
not keep things out but welcomes them in.

Hack mentions how his son used to mow the grass
across the road at Opha Miller’s house (yes, the very
same Opha now living in the next room!). Hack, speaking of his son while pointing to the arch in the picture,
says:
Hack: “He sees now what old Dad did. I did that.”
Phil: “You did?”
Hack: “A windstorm blew it down… My son said [to the insurance
man], ‘There’s nobody gonna fix that unless they put it back
exactly like Dad had it!’ This guy looked at it and said, ‘I’ll put
it back exactly like that’... and he did.”

Pointing to the stone work, Hack says:
Hack: “I cut every one of them with a pitchin’ tool.”
Phil: “You cut it with pitching tools... You mean you dug them out
of the ground?”
Hack: “You face it.”
Phil: “You call that ‘pitching it’?”
Hack: “Yeah, ‘pitching it’ is making rock face out of it... and squarin’
it up—it’s a breakin’ tool [shows me the movement of the tool in
a chopping motion with his hands]... something like a big wide
chisel, but it’s cut on just like that—you get that just right and
it’ll break the rock. But you line it with a square, and then cut it.
Put your rock face on it.”

A

s he talks about his life, I stand in awe, reminded
of how I love the work that brings me here to listen. When Hack talks about doing some “water
witchin’” as a kid and not finding a forked peach branch,
he lets me know with his hands how he improvised with a
“coke bottle and a number nine wire.” When he tells about
the man from Texas who came up to drill wells, it seems
important to remark that he used a number five casing,
“not a number six like they use around here.” And when
Hack drew his water from a rock spring out at his Greene
County home, it was cold: “It was at least 51 degrees, and
that water in the wintertime would feel good on your
hands.”
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As he talks, his body enters into the conversation. The objects we use to construct our
conversation, the pictures on the wall, help cement the relationship between us and place us
in the imaginary landscape we are noting together.
A conventional, semiotic understanding of
the objects in Hack’s room might suggest that
the stone arch represents Hack’s friendliness
and hospitable nature. It might suggest that the
arch represents Hack’s valued past, which it
does. The stone arch is significant. It does have
symbolic import—as a symbol of his artisanship and a vehicle for a son’s pride of father.
But the arch is more than that. It’s a presence in and of itself. As Hack stands there and
“faces” those rocks with his hands, that arch is
rebuilt, recreated anew, re-experienced not as
symbol but as home itself. As Hack’s body enters into this process of memory, the effect is
transformational, in Barbara Myerhoff’s sense,
in that the past enters into the present and
transforms the institutional space of his room
into the place of his experience [1].
Gaston Bachelard, in The Poetics of Space,
describes this memory of the body:
...the house we were born in is physically inscribed in us. It is
a group of organic habits. After twenty years, in spite of all
the other anonymous stairways, we would recapture the
reflexes of the “first stairway,” we would not stumble on that
rather high step. The house’s entire being would open up,
faithful to our own being. We would push that door that
creaks with the same gesture, we would find our way in the
dark to the distant attic. The feel of the tiniest latch has
remained in our hands [2].

Wendell Berry, Kentucky farmer, poet, and
essayist describes this bodily attachment to
place in his short novel, The Memory of Old
Jack, in which elderly Kentucky farmer Jack
Beechum no longer farms his old place.
Though he lives in the boarding house in town,
he dwells in the memories of place:
[But] the present is small and the future perhaps still
smaller. And what his mind is apt to do is leap out of
that confinement, like an old dog, still strong, that has
been penned up and then let loose in the one countryside
that it knows and that it knew for a long time. But it is
like an old dog possessed by an old man’s intelligent

ghost that remembers all it has seen and done and all the places it
has known, and that goes back to haunt and lurk in those places.
Some days he can keep it very well in hand, just wandering and
rummaging around in what he remembers. He is amazed at what he
comes upon that he thought he had forgot… Sometimes he can recover a whole day, with the work he did in it, and the places, and
the animals and the people and even the words that belong to it [3].

S

o memory of home is not merely symbolic and representational but draws upon one’s whole being as it is
recollected. The proper study of it is not semiotic but
phenomenological. As the original experience involves the
whole body, is it any wonder that its memory should do the
same?
In ways that are compelling to me because they resonate with my experience of place, Bachelard, Berry, Hack,
and Opha point to the role that memory plays in converting
empty space into place. Important objects are not mere
souvenirs (though the root meaning of the word suggests a
bodily “coming back again”). They take on meaning as
they evoke narrative and recreate bodily experiences.
Memory, it seems, is the hallmark of a good place. We
might say that a good place remembers itself to us. More
properly, we might say that a good place has a kind of mirror quality because it helps us to remember ourselves to
ourselves. Kathleen Woodward cites a passage from The
Stone Angel, by Margaret Laurence, in which 90-year-old
Hagar Shipley finds himself in his objects:

My shreds and remnants of years are scattered through it [the
house] visibly in lamps and vases...If I am not somehow contained
in them and in this house, something of all change caught and fixed
here, eternal enough for my purposes, then I do not know where I
am to be found at all [4].

A good place is a “keeping place.” It holds people together through their common participation in its qualities.
As Wendell Berry put it in another essay, “a human community, then, if it is to last, must exert a kind of centripetal
force, holding local soil and local memory in place” [5] .
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